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Article 
Making Defendants Speak 
Ted Sampsell-Jones† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Criminal defendants have a right to testify in their own de-
fense.1 They also have a right to remain silent at trial.2 Under 
the Constitution, the choice is theirs.3 
But while the abstract constitutional ideal of free choice is 
appealing, the complicated and messy reality of modern crimi-
nal trials makes it impossible to grant a defendant a truly free 
choice. A defendant’s decision is not made in a legal vacuum. 
Myriad legal rules—rules of evidence, rules of procedure, and 
rules of substantive criminal law—affect his choice. Some legal 
rules burden testimony and encourage silence. Other legal 
rules burden silence and encourage testimony. 
State neutrality between testimony and silence is neither 
possible nor desirable.4 Any legal rule that affects testifying 
and non-testifying defendants differently will burden one right 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Thanks 
to George Fisher, John Langbein, and Brad Colbert for their helpful com-
ments. Copyright © 2009 by Ted Sampsell-Jones.  
 1. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49–53 (1987). The right to testify 
has no explicit textual source but rather “has sources in several provisions of 
the Constitution,” including the Due Process Clause and the Compulsory 
Process Clause. Id. at 51. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 3. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (“Every criminal de-
fendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.”); see 
also Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 (stating that the Constitution ensures the “right of a 
criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying in his own behalf ” 
(quoting Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark, J., concur-
ring))). 
 4. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) (stating that the 
Constitution does not forbid “every government-imposed choice in the criminal 
process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional 
rights”). 
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or the other. Such rules pervade the criminal process, and re-
moving them all would be impossible, or at least unwise. 
When a defendant takes the stand, for example, the prose-
cutor may cross-examine him. The prosecutor’s ability to cross-
examine a defendant chills the latter’s right to testify—it 
makes the exercise of that right costly. In the interest of elimi-
nating the cost, we could reform evidence law to prohibit prose-
cutorial cross-examination of criminal defendants. But such a 
reform would be senseless. Even if it would promote “neutrali-
ty” by unburdening the right to testify, it would be anomalous 
in evidence law, and it would impede the truth-seeking function 
of trial.5  
In any event, a debit on one side of the ledger is a credit on 
the other. Under the current regime, one benefit of remaining 
silent is the ability to avoid cross-examination. Removing the 
cost imposed on testimony would also remove the benefit asso-
ciated with silence. That dynamic applies generally for a simple 
reason: exercising the constitutional right to testify necessarily 
involves waiving the constitutional right to remain silent, and 
vice versa. To the extent that a legal rule creates incentives to 
exercise one right, it inevitably creates disincentives to exercise 
the other. It is a zero-sum game.  
Thus, the question is not whether the current set of rules 
burdens the exercise of either right—of course it does, as would 
any reasonable set of rules. The question is not whether the 
current set of rules is neutral between the two options—it is 
not neutral, and no reasonable set of rules could be neutral. In-
stead, the question is simply whether the current set of rules 
creates the proper mix of incentives and disincentives. In my 
view, it does not. The legal system punishes defendants too 
much for taking the stand, and rewards defendants too much 
for remaining silent. Courts should adjust the mix by reward-
ing defendants more for testifying and punishing them more for 
declining to testify.  
There are two main reasons why we should encourage 
more defendants to testify. First and foremost, it would give the 
jury access to important additional information, and thereby 
 
 5. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 57 (1978) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (“A defendant’s decision to testify may be inhibited by . . . the possibil-
ity that damaging evidence not otherwise admissible will be admitted to im-
peach his credibility. These constraints arise solely from the fact that the 
defendant is quite properly treated like any other witness who testifies at tri-
al.”). 
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help the jury reach accurate results. Second, it would increase 
defendants’ own participation in the criminal process, which 
would improve perceptions of legitimacy, thereby aiding reha-
bilitation and reintegration. Increasing lay participation would 
also reduce dependence on lawyers, which could reduce syste-
matic disparities between rich and poor defendants.  
Toward those ends, I propose three reforms. First, as a 
matter of constitutional criminal procedure, the Supreme Court 
should overrule Griffin v. California,6 and should thus allow 
prosecutors to argue adverse inferences from a defendant’s si-
lence. Second, as a matter of evidence law, courts should alter 
or abandon the Gordon v. United States7 test for Rule 609,8 and 
admit fewer prior convictions for impeachment. Third, as a 
matter of sentencing law, courts should not impose perjury en-
hancements based on a defendant’s trial testimony.9 
Of the countless possible reforms that could make more de-
fendants speak, these three are proposed in large part because 
each has independent legal merit. Each is justifiable at the doc-
trinal level—as a matter of evidence law, as a matter of crimi-
nal procedure, and as a matter of substantive criminal law. In 
addition to furthering the goals sketched above, each stands 
independently on a solid doctrinal footing.  
Taken individually, the first proposal would benefit the 
prosecution, while the second and third proposals would benefit 
defendants. Taken together, however, the goal of the proposed 
reforms is not to tip the scales in either direction. The goal, ra-
ther, is to encourage more defendants to speak at trial, and 
thus to increase the accuracy, legitimacy, and fairness of crimi-
nal adjudication. 
I.  RATIONALE   
Our current legal system encourages criminal defendants 
to remain silent. We should change the system in a way that 
 
 6. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Self-
Incrimination Clause prevents instructions and arguments suggesting an ad-
verse inference from a defendant’s silence). 
 7. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939–41 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (set-
ting forth factors that courts should consider when weighing the admission of 
prior felonies). 
 8. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (allowing the admission of prior felonies for 
impeachment subject to a probative-prejudice balancing test). 
 9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b) (2008) 
(allowing for a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, 
including trial perjury).  
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encourages more defendants to testify. Doing so would have 
several benefits. It would improve accuracy, participation, legi-
timacy, and equity. 
A. ACCURACY 
Criminal proceedings have some intrinsic value, but for the 
most part, their value is instrumental.10 The primary goal of a 
criminal proceeding is to determine whether a defendant com-
mitted a crime and, if so, what crime.11 Criminal proceedings 
have instrumental value insofar as they lead to accurate de-
terminations of those issues.12  
Criminal adjudication is a sorting process—the judicial 
system attempts to determine which defendants are guilty and 
which are not.13 It is a human system, and errors are inevita-
ble.14 There are two types of errors: false positives, where an 
innocent person is found guilty; and false negatives, where a 
guilty person is set free.15 Criminal law reform proposals often 
falter because they decrease one type of error only at the cost of 
increasing the other. Proposals aimed at providing greater pro-
tections to defendants may reduce false positives, but they al-
most invariably increase false negatives.  
 
 10. Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE L.J. 657, 
674–75 (describing the theory that constitutional “liberty” demands fair judi-
cial proceedings); Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. 
CT. REV. 85, 109–15 (discussing the Court’s instrumental justification for spe-
cifying process once a statute has specified substance).  
 11. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“[T]he central pur-
pose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt 
or innocence . . . .”). 
 12. See Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsi-
dered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 1030 (2006) 
(“[T]he main, though certainly not the only, goal for evidence law is to promote 
accuracy in fact finding.”). 
 13. See generally DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE 
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE (2003) (tracing the history of criminal procedure and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s role in the criminal procedure doctrine); see also Darryl K. 
Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From Institu-
tional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 817 (2004) (stating that the adversary 
criminal process has “a primary goal of truth-finding”). 
 14. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 155–57 
(Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2d ed. 2005) (1947) (discussing how medieval inquisitors 
insisted on confessions because of the possibility of error); LARRY LAUDAN, 
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 1–3 (2006) (describing the role errors play 
in criminal trials). 
 15. Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Finger-
print Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 994–95 (2005). 
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Historically, Anglo-American jurisprudence took the nor-
mative position that false positives are worse than false nega-
tives.16 As Blackstone famously said, “it is better that ten guilty 
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”17 Courts18 and 
academics19 tirelessly repeat the maxim. But Blackstone’s ten-
to-one ratio is not self-evidently true.20 Perhaps two-to-one is 
the correct ratio, or perhaps one hundred-to-one is best.21 Un-
derlying normative disagreement about the proper ratio, 
though it rarely rises to the surface of explicit argument, may 
well drive debates about specific reform proposals.22 
Regardless of the proper ratio, both errors are costly.23 To 
the extent that the judicial system can reduce both types of er-
ror, it should do so. If there are legal reforms that will increase 
the accuracy of the sorting mechanism—helping to convict 
more of the guilty and free more of the innocent—courts and 
legislatures should embrace them. Encouraging more defen-
dants to speak would increase the accuracy of the fact-finding 
 
 16. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1105 (1st Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22, 27–28 (2d Cir. 1989); People v. 
Scott, 151 P.2d 517, 527 (Cal. 1944); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 790 (Conn. 
1997) (Berdon, J., concurring and dissenting); McGinnis v. State, 31 Ga. 236, 
252 (1860); State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, 309 (Utah 2005). 
 19. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1523 (1996); Joshua 
Dressler, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the Supreme Court: 
How A Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1507, 1524 n.74 (1999); Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: 
Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific 
Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 775 (2007); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Cohe-
rence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Juri-
sprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1168 (2003); Dan Simon, A Third View 
of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 511, 572 (2004). 
 20. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174–77 
(1997) (asking why ten is the number indoctrinated in legal scholarship). 
 21. See Richard D. Friedman, A Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even 
Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873, 879 n.19 (2000). 
 22. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 413, 416–17 (1999) (arguing that empirical debates about deterrence 
mask cultural and moral conflict). 
 23. See Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 
DUQ. L. REV. 663, 680 (2004) (noting that “we see a great cost in any Type I 
error” [false positive] and that Type II errors [false negatives] impose “addi-
tional costs on society”); cf. Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending 
the Indefensible, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2004) (discussing the 
tradeoff between false positives and false negatives in the war on terrorism). 
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process. It would help to reduce both false negatives and false 
positives. 
Criminal defendants themselves are often a critical source 
of information about what happened.24 In some cases, such as 
homicide cases with no witnesses other than the defendant and 
the victim, the defendant is often one of the only good sources 
of information.25 Depriving the jury of defendant testimony de-
prives the jury of key information.26  
Paradoxically, the value of defendants as an informational 
resource was recognized at common law more than it is today. 
Defendants were not allowed to take an oath or formally testi-
fy, but they were expected to present their own defense, ans-
wering and explaining away the prosecution’s evidence.27 In 
fact, as Hawkins explained in the early eighteenth century, the 
common law denied the assistance of counsel in order to make 
defendants speak. 
[E]very one of Common Understanding may as properly speak to a 
Matter of Fact, as if he were the best Lawyer; and that it requires no 
manner of Skill to make a plain and honest Defence, which in Cases 
of this Kind is always the best, the Simplicity and Innocence, artless 
and ingenuous Behaviour of one whose Conscience acquits him, hav-
ing something in it more moving and convincing than the highest 
Eloquence of Persons speaking in a Cause not their own. . . . [T]he 
Innocent, for whose Safety alone the Law is concerned, have rather 
an Advantage than Prejudice in having the Court their only Counsel. 
Whereas on the other Side, the very Speech, Gesture and Counten-
ance, and Manner of Defence of those who are guilty, when they 
speak for themselves, may often help to disclose the Truth, which 
 
 24. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 1–9 
(2003) (discussing the importance of the accused as an informational re-
source). 
 25. See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229–41 
(1827) (describing the reasons behind the rule against self-incrimination and 
the value of self-provided testimony); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1376–77 (1991) 
(describing the privilege against self-incrimination as a truth-impairing right); 
John H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 86 
(1891) (“[I]f an accused person is innocent, he should be [able] to explain the 
facts of his conduct and vindicate himself . . . .”). 
 26. See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1076–77 (1986) (describing the effect 
on a jury of a defendant not testifying); Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let 
Alone, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 223 (1960). 
 27. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 14, 35–36 (describing the lawyer-free 
“accused speaks” criminal trial that prevailed in England from the sixteenth 
century into the eighteenth century). 
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probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial Defence of 
others speaking for them.28 
Hawkins was overly sanguine about the value of defen-
dants’ testimony. Some guilty defendants are slick liars, and 
their testimony may produce false negatives. Some innocent de-
fendants are bad witnesses, ineloquent, contradictory or nerv-
ous, and their testimony may produce false positives.29 On the 
whole, however, encouraging more defendants to testify would 
enhance the accuracy of the sorting process.  
Admittedly, there is no way to prove empirically that more 
defendant testimony would lead to more accurate results. 
There is no good way to study the effect of a defendant’s testi-
mony in a real trial without conducting the trial twice, once 
with the defendant’s testimony and once without.30 Mock trial 
studies, though they allow for a control group, have inherent 
limitations due in part to their inability to replicate real tri-
als.31  
Nonetheless, the common sense argument that more de-
fendant testimony would increase trial accuracy has some em-
pirical support. There is a body of research suggesting that 
while jurors do not have much ability to assess truthfulness 
based on a witness’s demeanor, they do have some ability to as-
sess truthfulness based on the content of a witness’s state-
ment.32 Moreover, the most recent empirical research provides 
more reason for optimism about jurors’ ability to detect lies, es-
pecially when jurors are provided with sufficient information to 
 
 28. 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 400, 
reprinted in AMERICAN LAW: THE FORMATIVE YEARS (photo. reprint 1972) (2d 
ed. corrected 1724). 
 29. See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893) (explaining that 
innocent defendants may fear testifying because nervousness may increase 
rather than remove prejudice against them). 
 30. Even if such an experiment were possible, it would be worthless with-
out knowing in advance the truth of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Con-
ducting a trial twice could demonstrate whether the presence of a defendant’s 
testimony affects the outcome. Without knowing actual guilt or innocence, 
however, there would be no way to know whether the presence of a defendant’s 
testimony led to the right outcome.  
 31.  See Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury 
Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997); see also Brian H. Bornstein, 
The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 75, 88 (1999). 
 32. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 
1100–01 (1991) (reviewing the empirical research and concluding that while 
jurors are not effective at detecting lies by viewing witness demeanor, they are 
at least somewhat effective at detecting lies by assessing the content of wit-
ness testimony). 
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provide context to any witness’s testimony.33 The research sug-
gests, in other words, that jurors with more information are 
more likely to reach correct results.34 Juries are not perfect lie 
detectors,35 to be sure, but they are decent. 
A defendant’s value as a resource of information does not 
mean, as Hawkins argued, that she should be denied counsel. 
Nor does it necessarily mean, as modern commentators since 
Bentham have argued, that the right against self-incrimination 
should be scrapped altogether.36 The more moderate point is 
simply that a defendant’s silence is truth-impairing, and that 
we should not enact or maintain legal rules that create a prefe-
rence for silence over testimony without a very good reason to 
do so. 
B. PARTICIPATION, LEGITIMACY, AND EQUITY 
Aside from the instrumental values of accuracy in sorting, 
criminal proceedings have intrinsic value as well37 because 
 
 33. See Bella DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the 
Detection of Deception, 1 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 347 (1997); Maria 
Hartwig et al., Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When 
Training to Detect Deception Works, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 604 (2006); 
Hee Sun Park et al., How People Really Detect Lies, 69 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 
144, 145 (2002). 
 34. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2568 (2008) (reviewing recent research and concluding 
that “[o]bservers not only use context, they also use it effectively”). 
 35. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 
578 (1997). 
 36. 5 BENTHAM, supra note 25, at 226–27. For examples of modern scho-
lars criticizing the self-incrimination right, see Dolinko, supra note 26, at 
1064; Donald A. Dripps, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Against Police In-
terrogation—and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701 (1988); and Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment 
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 672 
(1968). See also Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Les-
sons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8–11 
(1986) (discussing various critiques of the privilege). 
 37. For general discussions of the intrinsic value of legal procedures, see 
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democrat-
ic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893–94 (1999); Lani 
Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 
1413, 1489 (1991); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1212–13 (2001); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 482–91 (1986); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals 
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 296, 357–59 (1996); and Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 181, 226–32 (2004). 
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they create an opportunity for participation—a day in court.38 
For a criminal defendant, “a participatory opportunity may also 
be psychologically important” simply “to have played a part in” 
the process that decides his fate.39 Regardless of the result, 
criminal defendants view the process as more legitimate if they 
have the opportunity to tell their side of the story.40 
For defendants, the lack of any opportunity to participate 
in the process can be frustrating and alienating.41 The inability 
to participate causes negative perceptions of legitimacy and 
fairness.42 Those perceptions, in turn, can inhibit reintegration 
and foster recidivism.43 In short, “procedural justice shapes le-
gitimacy,” and “legitimacy shapes recidivism.”44  
 
 38. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (stating that the 
“[T]wo central concerns of procedural due process [are] the prevention of un-
justified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and di-
alogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.”); Henry J. 
Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275–77 (1975); 
William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Ade-
quacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 661, 662 
(1985); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More 
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 160–63 
(1978).  
 39. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural 
Due Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126, 127 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1977). 
 40. See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988) (demonstrating the importance of procedural 
justice to convicted criminals’ perceptions of fairness and legitimacy); see also 
Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical 
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 463–67 (2007) (ex-
amining the reasons given by criminal defendants who decline appointed 
counsel). 
 41. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defen-
dants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1494–96 (2005) (discussing how defendants’ 
silence decreases their understanding of and engagement with the criminal 
process, thus inhibiting remorse and rehabilitation); Michael M. O’Hear, 
Faith, Justice, and the Teaching of Criminal Procedure, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 87, 
90–91 (discussing a noninstrumental approach to criminal procedure). 
 42. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the 
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 167–68; 
see also United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing 
that allocution “helps assure the fairness, and hence legitimacy, of the sen-
tencing process”); United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 
1994) (“[A]llocution ‘has value in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of 
the process.’” (quoting United States v. Barnes, 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 
1991))); Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocu-
tion, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2672–74 (2007) (discussing the benefits to de-
fendants of allocution rights). 
 43. See Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Balanced and Restorative 
Justice: Prospects for Juvenile Justice in the 21st Century, in JUVENILE JUS-
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Many criminal defendants who would prefer to testify are 
dissuaded from doing so.45 Their attorneys advise them—quite 
correctly—that given the current set of legal rules, the relative 
costs of taking the stand are high, and that remaining silent is 
a far safer option.46 That dynamic has systematic costs, not just 
in the deprivation of information to the jury, but also in the de-
privation of the defendant’s opportunity to participate in a pro-
foundly important event in his life.47 
A beneficial side effect of increasing lay participation in the 
criminal process would be reducing dependence on lawyers.48 
When a criminal defendant does not testify, he must defend 
himself by proxy. He must rely on other defense witnesses, and, 
most importantly, on his attorney.49 Thus, when fewer defen-
dants testify, attorneys necessarily take a more important role 
in the criminal process.50  
 
TICE SOURCEBOOK 467, 468 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2004); Robin Bradley Kar, 
Hart’s Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. 393, 459–60 
(2007); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1342–43 (2006); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and 
Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
133, 178–81 (2003). 
 44. Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and 
Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the 
Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553, 
575–76 (2007). 
 45. See Natapoff, supra note 41, at 1471. 
 46. See id. at 1470. 
 47. See Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of Defen-
dant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 363, 393 (2003). 
 48. For general discussions of the economic and efficiency drawbacks of 
lawyer-dominated legal process, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); Roger C. Cramton, Deli-
very of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 
533–36 (1994); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. 
REV. 1, 19–20 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 
69 IND. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1993); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Law-
yers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 814–17 (1994); Michelle J. 
White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers’ Benefit from Litigation, 12 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 381, 393–95 (1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and 
the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1119, 1123–24 
(1997). 
 49. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 310 (“Adversary trial put in place a 
new conception of the trial, oriented on the lawyers. Criminal trial became an 
opportunity for defense counsel to test the prosecution case.”). 
 50. See Natapoff, supra note 41, at 1469 (“The most immediate engine of a 
defendant’s silence is his lawyer.”). 
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In a lawyer-dominated criminal process, the results can be 
skewed by the quality of legal representation. Defendants with 
lower quality representation are more likely to receive adverse 
results.51 On the whole, poor defendants are more likely to re-
ceive lower quality representation.52 A very wealthy criminal 
defendant can afford to hire a private attorney who, if paid 
hourly, has a substantial incentive to spend the time necessary 
to mount a vigorous defense.53 Wealthy defendants can also af-
ford to hire investigators, experts, and other witnesses.54 In 
short, for a wealthy defendant, defending herself by proxy is 
relatively easy and often beneficial. 
A poor defendant, by contrast, must rely on whatever sys-
tem of indigent defense the state provides—typically a public 
defender. While many public defenders are excellent attorneys, 
financial constraints on the system of public defense—
especially at the state level—often preclude the sort of aggres-
sive, thorough defense that defendants desire.55 Public defend-
ers often have large caseloads that make it impossible to devote 
significant time to any individual case.56 Because they are 
mostly salaried, they lack financial incentives to spend extra 
 
 51. See LANGBEIN, supra note 24, at 318. 
 52. See id. at 315 (discussing the “wealth effect” of the lawyer-dominated 
adversary criminal trial). 
 53. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Law-
yer Effort, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 251, 252–53 (1985) (discussing the incentives 
created by hourly pay); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991) 
(“The standard hourly fee eliminates an incentive the lawyer might have un-
der other fee arrangements to work insufficient hours on the case.”). 
 54. KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF 
ATTORNEYS AT WORK 5 (1985); Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, Public De-
fenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel: Does the Type of Criminal De-
fense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 409–11 (1991); William J. Gene-
go, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 787 (1988); Rodney Uphoff, 
Convicting the Innocent: Abberation or Systematic Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
739, 747. 
 55. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Sys-
tems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 48–49 (1995); Carol 
J. DeFrances, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, State-Funded Indigent Defense 
Services, 1999 (2001 N.C.J. 188464), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf. 
 56. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1729, 1765 (1993); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Mo-
tivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1240–41 (1993); 
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tak-
ing It to the Streets, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 153, 165 (2004). 
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time on any given case.57 They also lack resources needed to 
conduct full investigations, to hire experts, and to locate and 
prepare other witnesses.58 In short, poor defendants frequently 
receive less assistance from their attorneys than wealthy de-
fendants do. To the extent that legal rules increase the impor-
tance of attorneys in the criminal process, they increase dispar-
ities between rich and poor defendants. 
The current legal system encourages defendants to remain 
silent and thus encourages defense by proxy. The defense-by-
proxy system hurts poor defendants more than wealthy defen-
dants. Adjusting the incentives that shape the decision to testi-
fy would increase lay participation in the criminal process and 
reduce dependence on lawyers. 
II.  PROPOSALS   
For reasons of accuracy, legitimacy, and equity, it is worth 
considering measures that would encourage more criminal de-
fendants to testify. Of course, the value of testimony is not infi-
nite, and there are important countervailing considerations. 
Thus, it would not make sense to torture non-testifying defen-
dants, nor would it make sense to free testifying defendants 
from all manner of impeachment and cross-examination. But 
courts should pursue reasonable reforms to encourage more 
testimony. To the extent that courts depart from generally ap-
plicable rules of evidence and procedure, they should depart in 
a way that will result in more testimony, not less. 
Unfortunately, the criminal justice system currently de-
parts from generally applicable rules of law in ways that en-
courage silence. In several areas of law, courts have created 
doctrines that are internally unsound and create perverse in-
centives that dissuade defendants from testifying. These doc-
trines, in other words, are both dubious in their own rights and 
unwise as policy matters because they punish defendants too 
much for testifying and reward them too much for remaining 
 
 57. See Albert W. Alschuler, Guilty Plea: Plea Bargaining, in 2 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 832–33 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (discuss-
ing the perverse incentives of salaried public defenders); Stephen J. Schulho-
fer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1989–90 (1992). 
 58. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Eth-
ics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003); see also Mary Sue Backus & Paul 
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HAST-
INGS L.J. 1031, 1098 (2006); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense 
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 235 
(2004). 
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silent. Courts should reconsider these unsound and unwise 
judicial practices. 
Three such doctrines are targeted here.59 The first is the 
“no adverse inference” rule of Griffin v. California, which for-
bids prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s silence.60 The 
Griffin rule makes little sense as a matter of constitutional law, 
forbids a reasonable evidentiary inference, and is unduly soli-
citous of silence. The second is the Gordon v. United States test 
for Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the admission 
of prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment.61 The Gor-
don test fails to respect the text of Rule 609 or normal prin-
ciples of evidence law, and by admitting too many convictions, 
it severely punishes defendants who testify. The third is the 
judicial practice of enhancing sentences based on a defendant’s 
perjured trial testimony.62 Such sentence enhancements do lit-
tle to deter perjury, and they add another unnecessary disin-
centive to testifying.  
These three doctrines should be reformed. Legislatures 
could, of course, add additional and even stronger pro-
testimony reforms, but no such legislative reforms are consi-
dered here. The best first move is one that should be made by 
courts: they should clear their case law of the ill-advised, judge-
made doctrines that promote silence.  
A. PROPOSAL ONE: MOVING BEYOND GRIFFIN 
Griffin v. California is part of the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure canon. In Griffin, the Court held that prosecutors 
and trial judges may not suggest that any adverse inference be 
drawn from a defendant’s decision to remain silent at trial. The 
Court later extended Griffin to cover even indirect comments 
on silence,63 and to require a jury instruction prohibiting ad-
verse inferences.64  
 
 59. For a recent article arguing for a similar set of proposed reforms, see 
Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal 
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851 (2008). 
 60. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 61. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 
939–40 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 62. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2008).  For a dis-
cussion of state analogues, see infra note 210. 
 63. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (prohibiting the use of 
silence as “substantive evidence of guilt” in criminal cases). But see United 
States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 25 (1988) (holding that when defense counsel 
suggests that the prosecution prevented the defendant from telling his side of 
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The Court has since lauded the Griffin rule as “an essen-
tial feature of our legal tradition.”65 But such breathless praise 
does little to hide the fact that the Griffin rule is dubious both 
as a matter of evidence law and as a matter of constitutional 
law.  
1. Evidence and Inference in Griffin 
The facts of Griffin are worth recounting briefly, in part 
because they appear nowhere in the Supreme Court’s opinion. 
Early on the morning of December 3, 1961, a man named Al-
fredo Villasenor was walking down an alley when he saw Eddie 
Griffin emerge from a large trash box.66 Griffin zipped up his 
pants.67 Villasenor asked Griffin what he was doing and Griffin 
responded “Nothing” and walked away.68 Villasenor then dis-
covered Essie Mae Hodson in the trash box, badly beaten, 
bleeding and barely conscious.69 She died the next afternoon 
from head injuries.70  
Griffin stayed overnight with Essie Mae and her partner 
after drinking with them at a local bar.71 According to the pros-
ecution, Griffin fought Essie Mae’s partner in their apartment, 
then dragged her to the alley and brutally raped her.72 When 
he was arrested in Mexico, Griffin told police that Essie Mae’s 
injuries were sustained during the earlier fight in the apart-
ment, and that following that fight, Essie Mae had consented to 
sex in the trash box.73 
Griffin did not testify at trial74 (no doubt in part because 
the story he had told police was so wholly implausible). The tri-
al judge instructed the jury that “among the inferences that 
may be reasonably drawn” from the defendant’s silence, “those 
 
the story, the prosecution may point out the defendant’s failure to testify). 
 64. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 288 (1981) (holding that jury 
instructions are constitutionally required when properly requested by the de-
fendant). 
 65. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). 
 66. People v. Griffin, 383 P.2d 432, 434 (Cal. 1963), rev’d, Griffin v. Cali-
fornia, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 434–35. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 434. 
 72. Id. at 434–35. 
 73. Id. at 435. 
 74. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 609 (1965). 
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unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.”75 The 
prosecutor made the following argument to the jury: 
What kind of a man is it that would want to have sex with a woman 
that beat up if she was beat up at the time he left? He would know 
that. He would know how she got down the alley. He would know how 
the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He would know how 
long he was with her in that box. He would know how her wig got off. 
He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. He would 
know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cucumber 
when he saw Mr. Villasenor because he was conscious of his own guilt 
and wanted to get away from that damaged or injured woman. These 
things he has not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And 
in the whole world, if anybody would know, this defendant would 
know. Essie Mae is dead, she can’t tell you her side of the story. The 
defendant won’t.76 
2. Griffin’s Shaky Underpinnings 
The Supreme Court ruled that the adverse inference in-
struction and the prosecutor’s argument violated the Self-
Incrimination Clause.77 The Court’s opinion was, to put it gent-
ly, sparse. Its legal analysis essentially consisted of two sen-
tences: “It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a con-
stitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its 
assertion costly.”78  
The problem with the adverse inference, in the Court’s 
view, was that it imposed a condition on the exercise of the 
right.79 Griffin was, in other words, an application of the “un-
constitutional conditions” doctrine.80 The Court’s reasoning, 
 
 75. Id. at 610. 
 76. Id. at 610–11. 
 77. Id. at 612–15. 
 78. Id. The Court also noted that many state statutes prohibited adverse 
inferences from silence. Id. at 611 n.3. And the Court noted that “comment on 
the refusal to testify is a remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice.’” Id. at 614.  
 79. Id. at 614 (describing that if a defendant chooses to not testify, the 
prosecution is not allowed to use his silence as evidence against him). 
 80. For discussions of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see, for 
example, Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Un-
constitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 6–11 (1988); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Con-
stitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1935); Seth F. Kreimer, 
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1298–301 (1984); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Feder-
al Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1143 (1987); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415–
29 (1989). 
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however, like much of its unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
in other areas, lacked cogency and analytical rigor. 
At a minimum, the Griffin Court’s analysis moved much 
too quickly. The Supreme Court has occasionally made state-
ments to the effect that the state may not in any way punish 
the exercise of constitutional rights.81 But as the Court has rec-
ognized elsewhere, state actors routinely impose costs on con-
stitutional rights in various ways.82  
In fact, in the very context of a defendant’s decision to tes-
tify, the Court has recognized that a defendant’s decision may 
be limited and conditioned in various ways. Rule 60983 im-
peachment may penalize a defendant’s decision to testify—it 
makes the assertion of the right to testify costly. The rule has 
nonetheless been upheld against constitutional challenges.84 
Sentencing enhancements for perjury also make the assertion 
of a right costly, but they too have been upheld.85 Likewise, 
rules of evidence and procedure will occasionally preclude a de-
fendant from presenting a certain defense if he fails to testify.86 
 
 81. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1977) (“To punish 
a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due 
process violation of the most basic sort . . . .”). 
 82. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973) (stating that 
the Constitution does not forbid “every government-imposed choice in the 
criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitu-
tional rights”). 
 83. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 84. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759–60 (2000); see also 
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967) (“To say the United States Consti-
tution is infringed simply because this type of evidence may be prejudicial and 
limiting instructions inadequate to vitiate prejudicial effects, would make in-
roads into this entire complex code of state criminal evidentiary law, and 
would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.”); United States v. 
Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 846–48 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (rejecting constitutional challenge 
to a statute that admitted prior convictions without regard to any balancing 
test). 
 85. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96–98 (1993); United States 
v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978). 
 86. Attorneys may only present arguments based on evidence in the 
record. See United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 434 (6th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Earle, 375 F.3d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Trial courts may impose 
limitations on defense attorney’s arguments when an argument strays beyond 
evidence in the record. See United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir. 
1988); United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1982). Thus, for 
example, when a defendant fails to present any evidence supporting a theory 
of self-defense, the trial court may refuse to present a self-defense instruction 
and may forbid argument on the issue. See United States v. Perry, 223 F.3d 
431, 433 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scout, 112 F.3d 955, 960–62 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
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Such rules make the assertion of the right to remain silent 
more costly, but they are nonetheless constitutional. 
Griffin notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has repeated-
ly held that such conditions are constitutional because “it is not 
thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of 
criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros 
and cons in deciding whether to testify.”87 There is, in other 
words, no “categorical ban on every governmental action affect-
ing the strategic decisions of an accused, including decisions 
whether or not to exercise constitutional rights.”88 To strike 
down every law that imposes some cost on the right to testify or 
the right to remain silent would “would make inroads into this 
entire complex code of state criminal evidentiary law, and 
would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.”89 
Griffin’s stated rationale is grotesquely naïve. If there is a 
constitutional basis for the Griffin no adverse inference rule, it 
must be found elsewhere. What is needed is some theory to ex-
plain which conditions are constitutionally acceptable and 
which are not. 
a. Defining “Penalties”—The Baseline Problem 
As an initial matter, a sensible evaluation of the Griffin 
rule must incorporate the lessons learned from other applica-
tions of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. One of the 
first critical lessons is that without defining some baseline, 
there is no neutral, determinate way to classify what counts as 
a “penalty.”90 As constitutional law scholars have recognized in 
other contexts, what counts as a “penalty” or “benefit,” a “tax” 
or “subsidy,” depends on positing some legal or moral baseline 
from which departures can be measured.91  
 
 87. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971). 
 88. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96. 
 89. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 562. 
 90. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is 
an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion), 
70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 602 (1990) (“[T]he distinction between ‘subsidy’ and ‘pe-
nalty’ . . . rel[ies] on a baseline defining the ordinary or desirable state of af-
fairs. The courts must rely on some status quo to decide what people would 
‘otherwise’ receive.”). 
 91. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 298–301 (1993); 
Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1436; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987). For discussions of baseline problems in other 
contexts, see, for example, Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Base-
line Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 911, 956–72 (1989); Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional 
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Imagine two sentencing regimes. The first punishes crimi-
nal convictions with a sentence of ten years, but gives a credit 
of one year if the defendant testifies. The second punishes crim-
inal convictions with a sentence of nine years, but adds an ad-
ditional year if the defendant remains silent. The two regimes 
are equivalent. To distinguish the two on the ground that the 
first merely “rewards” testimony while the latter impermissibly 
“punishes” silence is a meaningless semantic game. 
The Supreme Court has at times played similar semantic 
games. In the American system of plea bargaining, for example, 
defendants receive lesser sentences if they accept a plea rather 
than going to trial.92 Some have argued that plea discounts are 
unconstitutional because they penalize a defendant for exercis-
ing his trial rights.93 The Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment by recharacterizing the imposition of a penalty as an op-
tional benefit: “we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for 
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn ex-
tends a substantial benefit to the State” by waiving his trial 
rights.94 That characterization might make sense, but only if 
there is some baseline from which to measure departures. 
Recharacterization could have worked equally well in the 
Griffin context. Rather than characterizing an adverse infe-
rence as a penalty on the right to remain silent, the Court could 
have said that an adverse inference rule extends a benefit to 
defendants in exchange for their waiver of the right to remain 
 
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 604 (1999); Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to 
Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 408–09 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanc-
tions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 645 (1996). 
 92. David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? 
Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 45, 45–47 (1982); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel 
and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1611 
(2005); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2004). 
 93. See, e.g., Albert A. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attor-
ney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 63–65 (1975); Malvina Hal-
berstam, Towards Neutral Principles in the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice: A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea Bargaining 
Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–10 (1982); Note, The Unconstitu-
tionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1387–90 (1970); Tina 
Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional 
Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 38 (2007); see also Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Para-
dox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 802–03 (2003) (comparing the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine with doctrines of waiver in criminal procedure). 
 94. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970). 
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silent. Once again, the only way to settle which characteriza-
tion is correct is by reference to some established baseline. 
The Griffin Court only hinted about its baseline. It noted in 
a footnote that forty-four states banned adverse inferences by 
statute—that California’s rule stood in opposition to the “over-
whelming consensus of the States.”95 Certainly, against the 
backdrop of an overwhelming legislative consensus to bar ad-
verse inferences, an outlier jurisdiction’s decision to depart 
might look like a penalty. More bluntly, the legal status quo 
frequently supplies a hidden but intuitive baseline condition. 
But as a matter of constitutional law, there is no reason that 
the legislative consensus in 1963 provides a permanent base-
line, and that any departure from there is unconstitutional. 
The Fifth Amendment does not mandate that all states must do 
forever what most states did in 1963. Griffin’s apparent base-
line, defined solely by the then-status quo, is untenable. 
b. Neutrality 
Griffin failed to define or justify any baseline to support its 
result. It also failed to recognize an important related dynamic: 
that in this context, there are not one but two rights necessari-
ly implicated. A defendant must either testify or remain silent; 
he cannot do both. A legal rule that raises the relative price of 
one right necessarily lowers the relative price of the other. If it 
is a zero-sum game, and there is no net loss, then the constitu-
tional difficulty dissolves. 
Recognizing that there are two rights at issue, however, 
suggests a different approach to the Griffin problem: an ap-
proach based on state neutrality.96 Some language in other Su-
preme Court cases, including Miranda, supports such a view.97 
An approach using neutrality as the touchstone might provide 
a sturdier foundation for the Griffin rule than the oversimpli-
fied unconstitutional conditions rationale offered in the opinion 
itself. 
 
 95. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965). 
 96. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: 
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996) (“Although 
officials need not encourage a suspect to remain silent, they must remain at 
least neutral toward her decision not to speak.”). 
 97. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (requiring state gov-
ernments to respect their citizens’ rights to remain silent until they choose to 
speak); see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976) (stating that 
a defendant must have “free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer”). 
 1346 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1327 
 
The difficulty with this approach lies in fashioning a work-
able definition of neutrality. It cannot be the case that any law 
that affects testifying and non-testifying defendants differently 
violates the principle of neutrality. It cannot be the case, in 
other words, that any rule that has the incidental effect of rais-
ing the relative cost of one right or the other is void as non-
neutral.  
Neutrality is not a novel concept in constitutional law, and 
a definition of neutrality for the Griffin context could be bor-
rowed from elsewhere. In the First Amendment context, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has held that where a “generally 
applicable” law has the “incidental effect” of burdening the ex-
ercise of a constitutional right, the Constitution is not of-
fended.98 Such laws are “valid and neutral” because their object 
is not to burden the right; rather, they apply generally and only 
burden the right incidentally.99  
Such an approach could help to explain the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of various laws affecting the decision to testi-
fy. Rules allowing impeachment of a defendant’s testimony, by 
prior convictions or other means, are valid because they are 
generally applicable rules that only incidentally burden the 
right to testify. Sentencing enhancements for perjury are valid 
because they punish lying on the stand, not the decision to tes-
tify itself. Because these rules (and myriad others) only inci-
dentally burden constitutional rights, they are neutral, and 
therefore valid. 
It could be argued that an adverse inference from silence, 
by contrast, violates the neutrality principle. It could be ar-
 
 98. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990); see Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (“[T]he 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit governments 
from burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws.”); Rice v. 
Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[S]peech which, in its 
effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may 
itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the 
constitutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”); see also Jed Ru-
benfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 768 (2001) 
(“[A] person who breaks a law not directed at speech can claim no constitu-
tional immunity just because he was acting for expressive reasons.”); Eugene 
Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharged Zones, 90 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1277, 1294–97 (2005). 
 99. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–80; see also Crawford v. Marion County Elec-
tion Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that a 
“generally applicable” photo-identification law for voters was constitutional 
even though it burdened the rights of certain voters). 
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gued, in other words, that an adverse inference from silence is 
invalid because it punishes the exercise of the right itself. This 
argument—an argument from neutrality—is probably the best 
possible justification for Griffin. 
The difficulty with the argument from neutrality, however, 
is that adverse inferences are themselves justified by generally 
applicable rules of evidence. As I will explain more fully below, 
generally applicable laws of evidence allow one party to argue 
an adverse inference from her opponent’s failure to produce re-
levant evidence, and generally applicable laws of evidence al-
low consciousness of guilt to be inferred from silence.100 These 
generally applicable rules, when applied to a non-testifying de-
fendant, burden the right to remain silent, but they do so only 
incidentally. 
Thus, just as it can be said that a perjury enhancement 
punishes a defendant’s decision to lie rather than his decision 
to testify, it can be said that an adverse inference punishes a 
defendant’s decision to withhold evidence rather than his deci-
sion to remain silent. Both laws are, in that sense, neutral. 
Even if the Constitution mandates state neutrality between 
testimony and silence, an adverse inference from silence is at 
least arguably consistent with neutrality. Efforts to re-ground 
the Griffin rule on a principle of neutrality might have no bet-
ter prospects than the usual efforts to ground the rule in the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
c. Compulsion: Text, History, and Policy 
In the end, however, there should be no need to engage in 
difficult debates about the nature of neutrality, for the Consti-
tution simply does not mandate neutrality. The Constitution 
does not say “Congress shall make no law respecting a criminal 
defendant’s decision to testify.” Rather, it simply says that no 
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”101 The relevant touchstone is compulsion. The 
text leaves open the possibility of some state regulation of a de-
fendant’s decision so long as the regulation does not rise to the 
level of compulsion. The threat of an adverse inference, which 
is after all a relatively trivial penalty compared to torture or 
contempt, does not constitute compulsion.102  
 
 100. See infra Part II.A.3.b. 
 101. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 102. See Akhil Reed Amar, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
51–61 (1997) (comparing different definitions of compulsion from torture to the 
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Of course, as in contract law, there is no easy way to draw 
the line between valid consent and invalid coercion, between 
permissible offers and impermissible threats.103 Threats in-
volve departures from “the normal or natural or expected 
course of events.”104 In other words, just as we can only diffe-
rentiate between penalties and rewards by positing some base-
line condition, we can only differentiate from offers and threats 
by positing some baseline condition.105  
If we appeal to history to supply the baseline, then Griffin 
fails, for adverse inferences from silence were long approved at 
common law, and “compulsion” was equated with sanctions 
akin to torture and contempt.106 Similarly, if we appeal to gen-
 
Court’s “trivial” application of the “no worse off ” standard including no ad-
verse inferences); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 439 (1987) (noting that Griffin endorses a view that even 
“pressure that is wholly informal and psychological” can constitute “compul-
sion”). 
 103. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 603, 615–26 (1943); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Dis-
tributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 478–83 (1980); Peter Westen, “Freedom” 
and “Coercion”—Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 571–73 
(1985); see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: 
Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. 
L. REV. 465, 468 (2005) (“Basic questions concerning voluntariness and free 
will—e.g., whether they exist, and if so, when they exist—have puzzled philo-
sophers for centuries and represent one of history’s Gordian knots.”). In crimi-
nal law, the debate arises in contexts such as blackmail and rape. See, e.g., 
Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropriation, and 
Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1460, 1463–68 
(1993); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 554 (1983); 
Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 
172–77 (1998); James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 670, 671 (1984). 
 104. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 
447 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (contrasting threats from offers 
based on whether the action’s consequences are worse or better than the origi-
nal course of events). 
 105. See Kreimer, supra note 80, at 1352; Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1436, 
1448 & n.142. 
 106. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 335 (1999) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“Our hardy forebears, who thought of compulsion in terms of the 
rack and oaths forced by the power of law, would not have viewed the drawing 
of a commonsense inference as equivalent pressure.”); J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME 
AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 348–49 (1986) (describing the 
“old” form of trial whereby defendants that remained silent were assumed to 
be unable to deny the validity of the evidence); 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (London, MacMillan 1883); 
John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The 
Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 82, 108 (R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997). 
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erally applicable rules of evidence to supply the baseline, then 
Griffin also probably fails, for adverse inferences from a party’s 
refusal to submit evidence in his possession are typically al-
lowed.107 For these reasons and others, the European Court of 
Human Rights has rejected claims that adverse inferences from 
silence necessarily constitute “improper compulsion.”108  
The only way to maintain Griffin is to supply some other 
baseline—that is, some policy argument about why adverse in-
ferences from silence are so abnormal or unnatural that we 
should treat them as a type of compulsion.109 The implicit base-
line policy argument of Griffin and related cases is that silence 
is preferable to testimony. In Griffin, the Court struck down a 
relatively minor penalty imposed on the right to silence, but in 
other cases, the Court has upheld major penalties imposed on 
the right to testify. For the reasons stated in Part II above, the 
Supreme Court’s implicit policy preference for silence over tes-
timony is wrong-headed. 
Griffin cannot be justified as an application of the uncons-
titutional conditions doctrine. It cannot be justified by reference 
to a principle of neutrality. And most centrally, it cannot be 
justified in terms of the text or history of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause. Given its unfounded preference for silence over testi-
mony, it cannot be justified as a matter of policy. It ought to be 
abandoned. 
3. Imagining a Post-Griffin World 
Overruling Griffin would throw the matter back to indi-
vidual jurisdictions. Some would allow adverse inferences and 
some would not.110 Some amount of national variation and ex-
perimentation would be both inevitable and beneficial.111 For 
 
 107. See infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text. 
 108. Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29, 60–64 (1996); see 
Mark Berger, Europeanizing Self-Incrimination: The Right to Remain Silent 
in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 373–80 
(2006) (discussing Great Britain’s permissive adverse inference statute and 
the European Court’s rulings on adverse inferences). 
 109. But see Godsey, supra note 103, at 492–95 (discussing the test for 
“compulsion” in formal settings as “objective” and prohibiting “objective penal-
ties” for choosing to remain silent such as adverse inferences, termination, and 
refusal of future state contracts).  
 110. Prior to Griffin, most American jurisdictions had passed statutes pro-
scribing adverse inference instructions and argument. See Griffin v. Califor-
nia, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965). 
 111. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that 
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the first time in decades, state courts and legislators would 
have the opportunity to reconsider their rules regarding ad-
verse inferences from a defendant’s silence. In deciding what 
course to choose, they should be guided by general principles of 
evidence law. 
a. Adverse Inferences and Privileges 
Two well-established principles of evidence law provide 
support for the idea that a prosecutor should be able to argue 
adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence. The first prin-
ciple is that when a party fails to produce evidence in its con-
trol, it is reasonable for the opposing party to argue an adverse 
inference.112 This principle dates at least to the early eigh-
teenth century and the chimney sweep’s jewel case.113 As the 
Supreme Court put it in Graves v. United States:  
The rule even in criminal cases is that if a party has it peculiarly 
within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would eluci-
date the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the pre-
sumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable.114 
The Graves “missing witness” rule retains vitality today.115 
The related law of spoliation allows an adverse inference to be 
drawn from a party’s destruction of physical evidence.116 Courts 
 
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.”). For academic discussions about the virtues of federalism in fostering 
innovation and experimentation, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Fe-
deralism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1445–48 (1992); Charles Fried, Fede-
ralism—Why Should We Care?, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2–3 (1982); Ri-
chard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal 
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18 (2003). 
 112. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 264, at 220–26 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 
6th ed. 2006). 
 113. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (K.B.); see also 1 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT COMMON LAW § 285, at 368–70 (Boston, Little et al. 1904) (discussing court 
decisions following Armory). For early American statements of the rule, see, 
for example, Gordon v. People, 33 N.Y. 501, 509 (1865). 
 114. 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893). 
 115. See United States v. Luvene, 245 F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2001); Rev-
son v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2000); Shank v. 
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 128 F.3d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Glenn, 64 F.3d 706, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Spinosa, 982 F.2d 
620, 632 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 698 (5th Cir. 
1984); State v. Malave, 737 A.2d 442, 452 (Conn. 1999); State v. Padilla, 552 
P.2d 357, 364 (Haw. 1976); People v. Savinon, 791 N.E.2d 401, 403–04 (N.Y. 
2003). 
 116. See Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2007); Morris v. 
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have thus recognized that a party’s destruction of evidence or 
refusal to produce evidence has evidentiary significance. 
The second principle is that a party’s silence, like other 
forms of conduct, may constitute an admission. “When a state-
ment is made in the presence of a party containing assertions of 
facts which, if untrue, the party would under all the circums-
tances naturally be expected to deny, failure to speak has tradi-
tionally been received as an admission.”117 
Indeed, “[s]ilence is often evidence of the most persuasive 
character.”118 Thus, for the purposes of the hearsay rule, silence 
can constitute an admission in some circumstances.119 Silence 
can also count as a prior inconsistent statement, both for hear-
say and impeachment purposes, when a party refuses to an-
swer questions prior to trial but then testifies at trial.120 Con-
sistent with these general principles, it is reasonable in at least 
some circumstances to treat a defendant’s silence at trial as a 
type of admission from which an adverse inference can be 
drawn. 
The application of those two principles is admittedly more 
complicated, however, when it comes to privileged materials. 
There is substantial evidence-law authority for the proposition 
that an adverse inference may be drawn from a party’s failure 
 
Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2004); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 
112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997); Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills 
Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982) (Breyer, J.); Brown v. Hamid, 
856 S.W.2d 51, 56–57 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET 
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.16, at 449–50 & n.30 (4th ed. 2005). 
 117. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 262, at 212. 
 118. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1923) 
(Brandeis, J.). 
 119. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (excluding adoptive admissions from 
the definition of hearsay); Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980); 
United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Tocco, 
135 F.3d 116, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505 
(9th Cir. 1991); White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 
1063 (W.D. Mo. 1985); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 
EVIDENCE § 8.29, at 778 (3d ed. 2003); Henry S. Hilles, Jr., Note, Tacit Crimi-
nal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 210, 229 (1963); see also United States v. 
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, (1975) (“Failure to contest an assertion . . . is consi-
dered evidence of acquiescence . . . if it would have been natural under the cir-
cumstances to object to the assertion in question.”).  
 120. FED. R. EVID. 613 & 801(d)(1)(A); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
235–38 (1980); United States v. Vaughn, 370 F.3d 1049, 1053 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Matlock, 109 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Carr, 584 
F.2d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 1978); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.40, 
at 522–23. 
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to produce privileged material, so long as the exercise of the 
privilege is within the party’s control.121 There is also some au-
thority, however, for the contrary principle that an adverse in-
ference may never be drawn from a party’s failure to produce 
evidence protected by a privilege.122 Jurisdictions that maintain 
the latter rule might keep the Griffin rule as a matter of evi-
dence law even if it were abandoned as a matter of constitu-
tional law. 
But there is good reason for treating the privilege against 
self-incrimination differently from statutory privileges such as 
the attorney-client privilege. Statutory privileges, for the most 
part, operate to protect communication in important personal 
or professional relationships such as the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the physician-patient relationship, or the marital re-
lationship. Courts establishing a “no adverse inference” rule for 
statutory privileges have done so on the basis that adverse in-
ferences could chill communication and thus undermine those 
important confidential relationships.123  
The same rationale does not apply to the privilege against 
self-incrimination, which does not protect confidential commu-
nications. Its purpose (though disputed and never clearly un-
derstood) is to prevent coercion and unreliable confessions, and 
perhaps to promote some measure of individual autonomy and 
dignity.124 Allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from a de-
fendant’s failure to testify would not significantly undermine 
those goals. Adverse inferences would create an additional dis-
incentive for exercising the right to silence, but that would 
simply mean that more defendants would exercise the right to 
testify, which is also autonomy-enhancing.  
 
 121. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1977); Phillips v. Chase, 
87 N.E. 755, 758 (Mass. 1909); see also MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 233 (1942). 
 122. See John Deere Co. v. Epstein, 769 P.2d 766, 768–70 (Or. 1989) (dis-
cussing proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
§ 74.1, at 347 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
 123. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 
383 F.3d 1337, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Sanchez, 
176 F.3d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 124. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964) (dis-
cussing the various values served by the self-incrimination clause); Akhil Reed 
Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 922–25 (1995) (arguing that the 
primary purpose of the clause is ensuring reliable trial evidence); see also Ste-
ven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 309, 313 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court has employed three 
theories to justify excluding confessions: ensuring reliability of confessions, 
preventing abuse by police, and protecting defendants’ autonomy). 
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In short, even those jurisdictions that do not allow adverse 
inferences based on the exercise of a statutory privilege should 
consider allowing adverse inferences based on the exercise of 
the self-incrimination privilege. As a few states have already 
recognized, the policy arguments for the former do not apply to 
the latter.125 The importance of defendants’ testimony at trial 
justifies incentives for testifying and disincentives for remain-
ing silent. Adverse inferences from silence make sense as a 
matter of policy and as a matter of evidence law. 
b. Argument and Instruction 
There is a common-sense inference from silence to guilt. As 
Justice Scalia argued in Mitchell, “If I ask my son whether he 
saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch, and he remains si-
lent, the import of his silence is clear.”126 But it is important to 
remember that silence does not always raise an inference of 
guilt. Silence is ambiguous, and in some situations, defendants 
have entirely innocent reasons for remaining silent.127 In fact, 
in some situations silence might raise a positively exculpatory 
inference, as where a defendant declines to take the stand 
simply because the prosecution’s case is so weak that there is 
no need to respond. 
For that reason, the significance of silence is a matter that 
both parties should be allowed argue to the jury (subject to im-
portant caveats outlined below).128 The prosecution should be 
allowed to argue that the defendant’s silence constitutes a tacit 
admission, while the defense should be allowed to argue a con-
trary inference. The strength of the opposing arguments will 
vary depending on the circumstances of the case, and the jury 
can decide which is more persuasive. 
A more difficult question is whether, in addition to allow-
ing argument by the parties, trial courts should give an in-
 
 125. See, e.g., WIS. R. EVID. 905.13 (forbidding adverse inferences based on 
statutory privileges, but allowing adverse inferences based on the exercise of 
the self-incrimination privilege in civil cases). 
 126. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see also Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The Fifth Amendment 
Privilege Against Cross-Examination, 85 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1674–78 (1997) (dis-
cussing the logic of adverse inferences from silence). 
 127. See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1975); United States 
v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Zaccaria, 240 
F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2001); Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTG-
ERS L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1995). 
 128. See infra Part II.A.3.c. 
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struction informing the jury that an adverse inference is al-
lowed.129 An adverse inference instruction would stamp the 
court’s imprimatur on the prosecution’s argument.130 That 
would have the beneficial effect of encouraging more defen-
dants to testify.131 But any instruction that captured the 
truth—that silence sometimes suggests guilt but sometimes 
does not—might be so watered down that it would have little 
effect.132 It would also add more bulk to jury instructions that 
are already too long.133 
Moreover, as a general matter, permissive-inference in-
structions are unnecessary where the significance of evidence 
can be appropriately assessed by the jury without any extra as-
sistance.134 The law of evidence regarding flight provides a good 
analogy. Like silence, flight is a type of conduct that in some 
 
 129. See Julie E. McDonald, Drawing an Inference from the Failure to Pro-
duce a Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 
61 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1430 (1973) (“[T]here is a difference between what the 
jury might infer on its own, which can never be completely controlled, and 
what the jury might think when the absence of certain evidence is highlighted 
by . . . the judge’s instructions.”). 
 130. United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting 
how particular jury instructions can have the unwanted result of putting the 
court’s imprimatur on one party’s theory of the case); Hous. 21, L.L.C. v. Atl. 
Home Builders Co., 289 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); Bird v. Ferry, 
497 F.2d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); see Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 
302 n.20 (1981) (“[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily 
and properly of great weight. . . .” (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 
614, 626 (1894))). 
 131. Arguably, if a jurisdiction decides to give an adverse inference instruc-
tion when defendants refuse to testify, it also should give a positive inference 
instruction when defendants do take the stand. But see United States v. Mc-
Quarry, 726 F.2d 401, 402 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing to give a consciousness of 
innocence instruction based on lack of flight); United States v. Telfaire, 469 
F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Scott, 446 F.2d 509, 
510 (9th Cir. 1971) (same). 
 132. Permissive-inference instructions regarding flight or missing wit-
nesses typically take pains to point out that an adverse inference is not the 
only inference that may be drawn. See KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL 
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.08, at 300, § 14.15, at 337 (5th ed. 
2000).  
 133. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instruc-
tions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (1988) 
(arguing that jury instructions are “lengthy” and confusing). 
 134. See State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 186 n.7 (Minn. 2002) (“Permis-
sive-inference instructions are also unnecessary in that ‘[i]f the rational con-
nection between facts presented and facts inferred is derived from common 
sense and experience, the matter can normally be left to the jury’s judgment 
upon general instructions.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
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circumstances suggests consciousness of guilt.135 Of course, 
flight does not always suggest guilt—in some cases a defendant 
flees for innocent reasons.136 In part for that reason, a number 
of appellate courts have sensibly held that permissive-inference 
instructions on flight are disfavored, and that the matter 
should be left to the arguments of counsel.137  
Courts should apply the same approach to evidence of a de-
fendant’s silence. With such evidence, as with evidence of a de-
fendant’s flight, “[t]he interest of justice is perhaps best served 
if this matter is reserved for counsel’s argument, with little if 
any comment by the bench.”138 
c. Fair Response and Unfair Prejudice 
As discussed above, a defendant will sometimes decline to 
testify for entirely innocent reasons, and the defense should 
have an opportunity to argue against any adverse inference 
that may be drawn from this silence. The matter should be ar-
gued by both sides, and the jury should decide which argument 
is more persuasive. This approach, however, can only work 
where both sides have a fair opportunity to present an argu-
ment on the subject.139 In some cases, a defendant will not be 
 
 135. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 157 (2d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1000–01 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sil-
verman, 861 F.2d 571, 581 (9th Cir. 1988); People v. Howard, 175 P.3d 13, 27 
(Cal. 2008); see 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 263, at 217. 
 136. “[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely inno-
cent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being appre-
hended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.” 
Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896); accord United States v. Sa-
lamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Hernandez-
Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 
849, 869 (Mich. 1996); State v. Patton, 930 P.2d 635, 644 (Mont. 1996). 
 137. State v. Wrenn, 584 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Idaho 1978); Dill v. State, 741 
N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. 2001); State v. Bone, 429 N.W.2d 123, 125–27 (Iowa 
1988); State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2006); State v. Hall, 991 
P.2d 929, 930 (Mont. 1999); State v. Stilling 590 P.2d 1223, 1230 (Or. 1979); 
State v. Grant, 272 S.E.2d 169, 171 (S.C. 1980); see also MUELLER & KIRKPA-
TRICK, supra note 119, § 4.4, at 164 (stating that the “better practice” is to 
“forgo any jury instruction on the point”). 
 138. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. 
United States v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256, 1263 (8th Cir. 1991) (asserting that 
flight evidence is only “marginally probative” and that district courts may 
choose not to mention it in jury instructions).  
 139. One way that a party’s evidence can be unfairly prejudicial is if the 
opposing party has no opportunity to respond. See United States v. Lee, 274 
F.3d 485, 495–96 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 
823–24 (4th Cir. 2000); Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 301 (Ill. 1988); Gen. 
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able to explain his decision to remain silent without revealing 
unfairly prejudicial information to the jury. In such cases, the 
entire matter should be removed from consideration, and no 
argument should be allowed on either side.140 
Once again, cases involving flight evidence provide a good 
source of guidance. Ordinarily, both sides may argue that the 
jury should draw contrary inferences from flight.141 But in some 
cases, a defendant’s explanation for his flight will reveal unfair-
ly prejudicial information—for example, if the defendant fled 
based on fear of apprehension for a separate offense.142 In such 
cases, the court may not instruct the jury to consider the defen-
dant’s flight as evidence of his guilt, and the prosecution is not 
allowed to argue as much.143 
The same general rules should apply to evidence of a de-
fendant’s silence at trial. Thus, for example, if a defendant de-
clines to take the stand in order to avoid the prosecution’s use 
of other crimes for impeachment,144 the prosecution should not 
be able to argue that the defendant’s silence constitutes an ad-
mission. In that situation, the defendant would not have an op-
portunity to explain his silence without revealing unfairly pre-
judicial information.145 Prosecutors should therefore be forced 
 
Motors Corp. v. Seay, 879 A.2d 1049, 1062 & n.19 (Md. 2005); see also MUEL-
LER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.9, at 173 (“[S]urprise may sometimes 
be a factor in a finding that evidence will result in unfair prejudice . . . .”). 
 140. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Impoverishing the Trier of Fact: Exclud-
ing the Proponent’s Expert Testimony Due to the Opponent’s Inability to Afford 
Rebuttal Evidence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2007) (asserting that the 
risk of a jury overvaluing certain evidence is “obviously magnified when the 
opponent cannot afford a rebuttal”); cf. United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 
1382, 1394 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Unless the jury knows exactly why a party did not 
call a witness, it cannot fully evaluate the meaning of the witness’s absence.”). 
 141. Cf. United States v. Obi, 239 F.3d 662, 666 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
evidence was presented as to what inferences the jury could draw). 
 142. See United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 740 (4th Cir. 1976); 2 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 263, at 218 (“Particularly troub-
lesome are the cases where defendant flees when sought to be arrested for 
another crime, is wanted for another crime, or is not shown to know that he or 
she is suspected of the particular crime.”(footnotes omitted)). 
 143. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Foutz, 540 F.2d at 739–40; Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988, 997 (Fla. 1997); 
Mack v. State, 650 So. 2d 1289, 1308–10 (Miss. 1994); Guy v. State, 839 P.2d 
578, 583 (Nev. 1992); 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5181, at 261–62 & n.50 (1978 & Supp. 
2008). 
 144. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (allowing the admission of evidence of other 
crimes for impeachment purposes); infra Part II.B. 
 145. Cf. Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-
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to decide between introducing evidence of other crimes for im-
peachment purposes and arguing an adverse inference from a 
defendant’s failure to testify; they should not be allowed to do 
both, and a judge should address the matter efficiently, before 
or during trial.146 Consistent with general principles of evi-
dence law,147 a prosecutor should only be allowed to argue an 
adverse inference if the defendant has a fair opportunity to re-
spond. 
d. A Return to the Baseline 
Griffin’s “no adverse inference rule”148 marks a departure 
from generally applicable rules of evidence. Measured from 
that baseline, Griffin offers criminal defendants an extra sub-
sidy for remaining silent.149 Griffin is dubious as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation, and as a policy matter it is un-
wise to subsidize silence. Griffin should be abandoned. 
In the absence of a constitutional command, states could 
experiment with different approaches to silence. General prin-
ciples of evidence law, such as those adopted in cases of a de-
fendant’s flight,150 provide a good rough guide. The best result 
would be the following simple rule: “Unless the defense would 
not have a fair opportunity to respond, the prosecution may ar-
 
Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 678–
80 (1991) (discussing the relationship between Rule 609 evidence and the Grif-
fin rule, and arguing that character evidence of the accused should not be al-
lowed and that Griffin may require a reexamination).  
 146. Courts endorse a similar approach when a party seeks to draw an ad-
verse inference from the opponent’s failure to call a witness:  
The better practice . . . is for the party seeking to obtain a charge en-
compassing such an inference to advise the trial judge and counsel 
out of the presence of the jury, at the close of his opponent’s case, of 
his intent to so request and demonstrating the names or classes of 
available persons not called and the reasons for the conclusion that 
they have superior knowledge of the facts. This would accord the par-
ty accused of nonproduction the opportunity of either calling the des-
ignated witness or demonstrating to the court by argument or proof 
the reason for the failure to call. Depending upon the particular cir-
cumstances thus disclosed, the trial court may determine that the 
failure to call the witness raised no inference, or an unfavorable one, 
and hence whether any reference in the summation or a charge is 
warranted. 
People v. Ford, 754 P.2d 168, 178 n.8 (Cal. 1988) (quoting State v. Clawans, 
183 A.2d 77, 82 (N.J. 1962)). 
 147. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613–14 (1965). 
 149. Cf. id. at 613–14 (prohibiting prosecution from commenting on silence, 
thereby encouraging a defendant’s avoidance of the witness stand). 
 150. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
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gue that the defendant’s silence raises an inference of guilt, but 
the court should not endorse the inference.” That rule would 
conform to the larger landscape of evidence law, and it would 
encourage more defendants to testify. 
B. PROPOSAL TWO: ABANDONING THE GORDON TEST FOR RULE 
609 
Like Griffin’s “no adverse inference” rule,151 many other 
rules raise the relative cost of testimony. Of these, one of the 
most powerful is Federal Rule of Evidence 609. American law 
generally excludes evidence of a defendant’s bad character, in-
cluding evidence of his prior criminal convictions.152 Rule 609 is 
an exception to the character evidence rule—it allows the ad-
mission of some convictions as impeachment evidence if the de-
fendant takes the stand.153 The accepted theory of the Rule 609 
exception is that when a defendant takes the stand, his prior 
convictions can be used to demonstrate his character for un-
truthfulness as a witness but not his character for criminality 
as a defendant.154 
Thus, under the accepted theory of the rule, if a defendant 
testifies, the prosecutor may use his prior rape conviction to 
show that he is a liar, but not that he is a rapist. That any hu-
man fact finder could so limit the evidence is dubious,155 and a 
substantial body of empirical literature questions the Rule’s 
premise.156 Several commentators, characterizing the theory of 
 
 151. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613–14. 
 152. See FED. R. EVID. 404; Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–
82 (1997); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 188. 
 153. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3); FED. R. EVID. 609(a); 1 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 194. 
 154. See United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, 
J.). 
155 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.29, at 492–93 (discussing 
the difficulties with Rule 609 impeachment); Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock 
and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 
42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997) (same); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, 
and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 
792–93 (1993) (same). 
 156. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand 
on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to 
Testify and on Trial Outcomes (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-
012, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998529 (summarizing social 
science research demonstrating that jurors routinely misuse Rule 609 evi-
dence as evidence of the defendant’s general propensity for guilt rather than 
just evidence of truthfulness). 
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Rule 609 as a rank fiction, even call for its repeal.157 Whatever 
the merits of that argument, for my purposes it is enough to 
say that courts expand this arguably unwise exception to the 
character rule beyond all sense of proportion. 
Much of the fault for this situation lies at the feet of Gor-
don v. United States.158 In Gordon, then-Judge Warren Burger 
set forth a five-factor test governing the admission of prior con-
victions for impeachment.159 The five factors are: (1) the nature 
of the prior offense; (2) the staleness of the prior offense; (3) the 
similarity of the prior offense to the charged offense; (4) the im-
portance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of 
the credibility issue.160 The Gordon test is very influential;161 
most federal circuits and many state courts have adopted the 
test, in whole or in part, to interpret Rule 609 or the corres-
ponding state version of that Rule.162  
 
 157. See Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4 (1999); Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evi-
dence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Personality and Situation, 43 
DUKE L.J. 816, 831 (1994); cf. Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presump-
tions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 
135, 135–36, 138 (1989) (arguing for amendment of Rule 609, but not outright 
appeal). But see Roger C. Park, Impeachment with Evidence of Prior Convic-
tions, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 793, 813–17 (2008) (offering a defense of allowing evi-
dence of prior convictions as impeachment evidence). 
 158. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 159. See id. at 939–41. In Gordon, Judge Burger did not explicitly number 
the factors, but the test is referred to as a five-factor test. See, e.g., Roderick 
Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
A Suggested Approach to Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 942 (1980). 
 160. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 939–41. 
 161. See United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 617–18 (2d Cir. 2005); 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.31, at 496–99; 2 STEPHEN A. 
SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1033 (7th ed. 1998). 
For an extensive discussion of jurisdictional variations on the test governing 
the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, see generally 
Dannye R. Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to Im-
peach: State Supreme Courts’ Interpretative Standards, 1998-2004, 2007 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 307. 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 908–09 (11th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Meyers, 952 F.2d 914, 916–17 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Acos-
ta, 763 F.2d 671, 695 n.30 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Grandmont, 680 
F.2d 867, 872 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982); Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 
n.4 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977); Jackson v. 
State, 668 A.2d 8, 14 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 417 N.E.2d 950, 955 
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The widespread adoption of Gordon, however, does a dis-
service to Rule 609 and to evidence law. The five-factor Gordon 
test is both overinclusive and underinclusive. In structure, it 
has obscured the balancing test prescribed by the Rule. On the 
whole, it has prevented courts from recognizing simple proposi-
tions that should guide—and limit—application of Rule 609.  
1. Overinclusiveness 
The Gordon test is overinclusive. It sets forth five factors 
that courts applying Rule 609 should consider, but four of those 
five factors should bear little or no weight in a proper Rule 609 
analysis. 
The first Gordon factor is the nature of the prior convic-
tion.163 The principle suggested in Gordon is that certain 
crimes reflect strongly on credibility while other crimes reflect 
on credibility only weakly.164 But the application of this factor 
has often befuddled courts. It is often difficult to classify crimes 
as one or the other. 
For example, which crime reflects more on credibility, theft 
or rape? On one hand, theft might be more sneaky, more sug-
gestive of mendacity, and thus more probative of credibility. On 
the other hand, rape is a more serious crime and a more serious 
transgression of social norms. Compared to a defendant who 
has only committed a relatively minor felony theft, a defendant 
who has committed a crime as serious as rape might be more 
likely to commit perjury. Courts scatter on these issues in part 
because the question itself is muddled by substantial incohe-
rence.165  
 
(Mass. 1981); State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537–38 (Minn. 1978); Peterson 
v. State, 518 So. 2d 632, 636 (Miss. 1987); State v. Eugene, 340 N.W.2d 18, 34 
(N.D. 1983); State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 585 (Or. 1984); Theus v. State, 
845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1334 (Utah 1986).  
For variations on the Gordon test, see, for example, People v. Castro, 696 
P.2d 111, 114 (Cal. 1985); Label Sys. Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 852 A.2d 703, 
720–21 (Conn. 2004); People v. Cox, 748 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Ill. 2001); State v. 
Axiotis, 569 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa 1997); State v. Smith, 553 N.W.2d 824, 827 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996). 
 163. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940. 
 164. Id.; see also Estrada, 430 F.3d at 617–19; Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 
1159, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting People v. Beagle, 492 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Cal. 
1972)); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 516 (Mich. 1988); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.05[3][b] (Jo-
seph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 165. Some courts, for example, hold that rape convictions are “not highly 
 2009] MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK 1361 
 
Admittedly, there are good arguments that some crimes do, 
in fact, have more probative value than others. For example, 
because perjury involves intentional wrongdoing, prior crimes 
involving intentional wrongdoing may reflect more on character 
for truthfulness than prior crimes involving mere recklessness 
or negligence. It could be thus be argued under the first Gordon 
factor that intentional murder is more probative of truthfulness 
than vehicular manslaughter. But even if there is some real dif-
ference in the probative value of various non-crimen falsi felo-
nies, it is questionable whether there is very much. When it 
comes to the first Gordon factor, the game probably is not 
worth the candle. The first Gordon factor receives more atten-
tion than it deserves. 
The second Gordon factor is the remoteness of the prior 
conviction.166 Gordon suggests the principle that a nine-year-
old offense is less probative than a one-year-old offense, and 
thus that the latter should be admitted more readily than the 
former.167 But prejudicial impact can decline along with proba-
tive value.168 A nine-year-old offense is less probative than a 
one-year-old offense, but it also creates less potential for unfair 
prejudice.169 The second Gordon factor also receives more at-
tention than it deserves; arguably, it should be excluded alto-
gether.170 
 
probative of credibility.” Christmas v. Sanders, 759 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir. 
1985). Other courts disagree. See, e.g., State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 
(Minn. 1998). Some courts hold that drug convictions have only slight proba-
tive value. See, e.g., Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 
1977). Other courts disagree. See, e.g., United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 
864, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 
(2d Cir. 1977) (arguing that while “mere narcotics possession” has relatively 
little probative worth, drug smuggling “ranks relatively high on the scale of 
veracity-related crimes”). 
 166. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940.  
 167. See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2005); Lipscomb, 
702 F.2d at 1062; United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940; State v. Gardner, 433 A.2d 249, 252 (Vt. 1981); 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.31, at 498; 4 WEINSTEIN’S FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 164, § 609.05[3][c]. 
 168. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.16, at 202 (“Ironi-
cally, the risk of unfair prejudice sometimes increases even as probative worth 
increases.”). 
 169. United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 120 n.11 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“The older the evidence that a defendant was a bad character, the weaker the 
force of inference about his present character or propensity.”). 
 170. Of course, Rule 609(b) creates a general rule of exclusion for crimes 
older than ten years. Some courts have read that provision as expressing a 
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The fourth and fifth Gordon factors are the most puzzling 
of all. The fourth factor is the importance of the defendant’s 
testimony.171 Gordon suggests that if a defendant’s testimony is 
important, then impeachment might deter him from taking the 
stand and should not be allowed.172 The fifth factor—the cen-
trality of the defendant’s credibility173—suggests that if a de-
fendant’s credibility is important, then impeachment is also 
important and should be allowed.174  
The fourth and fifth factors do not really address probative 
value or potential for unfair prejudice, at least as those terms 
are usually conceived in evidence law. Rather, they simply re-
flect the competing policy arguments of the Rule’s internal 
compromise.175 It is sometimes useful to consider an evidence 
rule’s rationale when applying the rule, but in this case, the 
competing policy considerations simply cancel one another out. 
As a defendant’s testimony becomes more important, his credi-
bility also becomes more important.176 So as the fifth factor 
pulls more strongly for exclusion of prior convictions, the fourth 
factor pulls more strongly for admission.177 At best, the fourth 
and fifth factors are mostly meaningless. At worst, they confuse 
courts and distract from the real issues that should be consi-
dered. 
In sum, these four Gordon factors have little or no value in 
assessing the probative value or prejudicial effect of a prior 
conviction admitted for impeachment. The Gordon test is thus 
 
conclusion that probative value fades more quickly than prejudicial effect. See, 
e.g., Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1062 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b) 
and reviewing its legislative history). By that logic, however, courts should al-
so consider the punishment authorized for the prior offense, as well as the age 
of the offender at the time of the prior offense. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), 
609(d). 
 171. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940–41 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 172. Id.; see also United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977); 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Utah 1987); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 119, § 6.31, at 499; 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 
164, § 609.05[3][e].  
 173. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941 n.11. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Surratt, supra note 159, at 943. 
 176. United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 54 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Jack-
son v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 16 (Md. 1995); State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 591 
(Or. 1984). 
 177. Surratt, supra note 159, at 945; Bruce P. Garren, Note, Impeachment 
By Prior Conviction: Adjusting to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, 64 CORNELL L. 
REV. 416, 435 n.114 (1979). 
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overinclusive—it focuses courts’ attention on factors that have 
little or no evidentiary salience. 
2. Underinclusiveness 
The Gordon test is also underinclusive. The five-factor test 
ignores two critical factors that should be considered by courts 
weighing the admission of prior convictions.178 
First, the Gordon test ignores the availability of other 
means of impeachment. A central principle of evidence law is 
that the probative value of a given piece of evidence depends on 
the availability of other evidence to prove the same point.179 As 
the Supreme Court put it, no piece of evidence is an island—
when we measure probative value, we must measure “dis-
counted probative value.”180  
That principle should be recognized in the Rule 609 weigh-
ing process just as it is in the Rule 403 weighing process.181 If 
the prosecution has other means to impeach a defendant, then 
the discounted probative value of proffered 609 convictions de-
creases.182 If the prosecution can, for example, call a witness 
 
 178. To be fair to Gordon, it must be noted that Judge Burger explicitly 
cautioned that “there are many other factors that may be relevant in deciding 
whether or not to exclude prior convictions in a particular case.” Gordon, 383 
F.2d at 940. Courts since then, however, have largely ignored that note of cau-
tion, settling instead for the relative security of the five-factor test derived 
from Gordon. But see State v. Trejo, 825 P.2d 1252, 1255–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1991) (noting that these factors “are not to be considered mechanically or in 
isolation”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 6.31, at 500 (“No 
thoughtful person is likely to be satisfied with any list of factors.”). 
 179. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (stating that the 
“availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor” to con-
sider in a 403 balancing test); 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 143, § 5250, 
at 546–47 (“The probative worth of any particular bit of evidence is obviously 
affected by the scarcity or abundance of other evidence on the same point.”).  
For examples of this principle in court opinions, see United States v. 
Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 800 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ali, 493 F.3d 387, 
391 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 51 (1st Cir. 2001); People v. Walker, 
812 N.E.2d 339, 347–48 (Ill. 2004); State v. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d 507, 521 n.2 
(La. 1982); People v. Hine, 650 N.W.2d 659, 662–63 (Mich. 2002). 
 180. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191 (1997). 
 181. See 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 161, at 1033 (discussing a pro-
posed amendment to Rule 609 that would have required consideration of other 
evidence offered to impeach). 
 182. This principle has been suggested by a few judges. See United States 
v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) (McKee, J., concurring); United 
States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985); People v. Rist, 545 P.2d 
833, 839 (Cal. 1976); State v. Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2005); State 
v. Gardner, 433 A.2d 249, 252 (Vt. 1981). 
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who will offer opinion testimony that the defendant has charac-
ter for untruthfulness,183 then the prosecution need not admit 
the defendant’s prior rape for impeachment. Likewise, if the 
prosecution has admitted one conviction for impeachment, then 
it need not admit a second and third.  
Second, the Gordon test ignores the relative severity of the 
prior conviction. It correctly recognizes under the third factor 
that if a prior conviction is similar to the charged offense, there 
is a greater potential for unfair prejudice.184 But the Gordon 
test fails to recognize that if a prior conviction is particularly 
lurid or inflammatory, there is also a greater potential for un-
fair prejudice. When analyzing the evidence of other acts cov-
ered by Rule 404(b), courts have consistently held that the in-
flammatory or lurid nature of the evidence weighs against 
admission.185 Moreover, as California state courts have recog-
nized with unusual clarity, relative severity is particularly im-
portant.186  
A defendant charged with murder will not be much preju-
diced by the admission of a prior burglary conviction. Few ju-
rors would convict a man of murder simply because they knew 
him to be a burglar. The potential for prejudice is much higher 
when the crimes are reversed—a defendant charged with bur-
glary will be greatly prejudiced by the admission of a prior 
murder conviction.187 In that scenario, the potential for preven-
 
 183. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked 
or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation . . . .”). 
 184. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 994–95 (8th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 470 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Virgin Islands v. 
Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 917 (3d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 
1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 996–97 (2d 
Cir. 1993); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 190, at 768 (discuss-
ing, in the 404(b) context, how the heinousness of the previous crime is an im-
portant factor to consider); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 119, § 4.16, 
at 201–02 (same). 
 186. See People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 772 (Cal. 1994) (“The testimony 
describing defendant’s uncharged acts, however, was no stronger and no more 
inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses.”); People v. 
Branch, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“The first factor we 
must consider is whether the uncharged offenses were more inflammatory 
than the charged offenses.”); see also State v. Beck, 745 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987); Marc v. State, 166 S.W.3d 767, 776 (Tex. App. 2005). 
 187. Compare People v. Ortiz, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 470, 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (affirming murder conviction where the state admitted evidence of prior 
crimes of drunk driving and speeding), with People v. Harris, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
689, 692–93, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing sexual assault conviction 
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tative conviction (a type of pro-prosecution nullification) is 
much higher. 
These principles comport with common sense and with the 
larger landscape of evidence law. Courts applying Gordon, 
however, have largely ignored them. Having enthusiastically 
adopted the five-factor test, they stopped looking for considera-
tions beyond those five mentioned in one case decided forty 
years ago by Judge Burger. 
3. Lost Balance 
Aside from any individual factor, the Gordon test also dis-
torts the underlying mechanics of Rule 609. Rule 609 is, by its 
terms, a balancing test: courts are instructed to admit prior 
crimes if and only if they determine “that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused.”188 Those words sound familiar, and for good reason—
they are borrowed from Rule 403, the all-encompassing fallback 
rule that allows for discretionary exclusion of relevant evi-
dence.189 In their eagerness to run through the five-box check-
list of the Gordon test, courts forget that their ultimate task is 
to balance probative value against the potential for prejudice. 
They forget that their task is simply to perform a version of the 
403 balancing test.190  
Courts have also forgotten that the 609 balancing test is a 
modified version of the 403 balancing test—and modified in a 
 
where the state admitted evidence of a prior crime involving sexual torture 
and mutilation). 
 188. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
 189. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 
403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. 
REV. 497, 497 (1983) (discussing the importance of Rule 403); Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evi-
dence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 905–06 (1988) (describing Rule 403 as “a corner-
stone of the Federal Rules [of Evidence]”); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in 
the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1097, 1120 (1985) (describing Rule 403 as the “most important” exclusio-
nary rule in the Rules of Evidence); Kathryn Cameron Walton, Note, An Exer-
cise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1053, 
1053 (1998) (“Rule 403 primarily serves as a guide for situations in which no 
other specific rules control.”). 
 190. See, e.g., State v. Gary M.B., 676 N.W.2d 475, 483 n.9 (Wis. 2004) (dis-
cussing state law analogues to Rules 403 and 609 and explaining that Gordon-
like factors “are merely elements to be considered” when balancing probative 
value against potential prejudice (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 904.03, 906.09(2) 
(West 2000))). 
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way that is tilted more in favor of exclusion.191 While Rule 403 
only allows exclusion if the potential for prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value,192 Rule 609 only allows admis-
sion if the probative value outweighs the potential for preju-
dice.193 That difference cannot be reduced to any bright-line 
rules of application, but it should not be forgotten. 
The proper metaphoric framework for applying Rule 609 is 
not any checklist of factors, whether numbered five or other-
wise. The proper metaphoric framework is a scale with two 
sides.194 On one side is the probative value, which will vary 
somewhat depending on the overall evidentiary posture of the 
case. On the other side is the potential for unfair prejudice, 
which will vary substantially depending on the overall eviden-
tiary posture of the case.195 Courts should simply do what the 
text of the Rule demands: compare one side of the scale to the 
other.  
In practice, especially as its application has calcified over 
the decades, the Gordon test has resulted in the admission of 
too many prior convictions for impeachment.196  
 
 191. See United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 160 (1st Cir. 2004); State v. 
Martin, 704 N.W.2d 674, 676 n.1 (Iowa 2005) (addressing state analogues to 
the federal rules); RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE 413 (3d ed. 2002); Uvil-
ler, supra note 155, at 799–800. 
 192. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair pre-
judice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” 
(emphasis added)); United States v. Jimenez, 507 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he Rule 403 analysis is confined to ‘unfair’ prejudice, and the scales do not 
tip in favor of exclusion unless the probative value is ‘substantially out-
weighed.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403)). 
 193. See FED. R. EVID. 609 (“[E]vidence that an accused has been convicted 
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the ac-
cused . . . .”). 
 194. Courts and commentators frequently invoke the scale metaphor when 
discussing the Rule 403 balancing test. See, e.g., Jimenez, 507 F.3d at 18; 
Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 566 n.18 (5th Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Davis, 181 F.3d 147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 195. The case-specific, context-specific nature of the inquiry is precisely 
why the Federal Rules of Evidence grant discretion to trial judges. See David 
P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 
959 (1990); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 413–14 (1989); Eleanor Swift, One Hundred 
Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437, 2443 
(2000); Waltz, supra note 189, at 1100. 
 196. Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion 
and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2296–97 (1994) (“Too 
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4. Replacing Gordon 
The five-factor Gordon test should be abandoned in favor of 
a two-sided balancing test consistent with the text and purpose 
of Rule 609. That balancing test should be guided by general 
principles of evidence law and common sense, both of which 
have been lacking in courts’ application of Gordon. 
a. Assessing Probative Value 
On the probative side of the scale, two key points should be 
remembered. First, in every criminal case, the defendant’s tes-
timony is important, and therefore any evidence impeaching 
his testimony will have significant probative value. Defendants 
take the stand to deny guilt. If that denial is believed, the jury 
will acquit. If some evidence can show that the defendant is not 
believable, either in this instance or in general, it will substan-
tially affect the result. Evidence impeaching a defendant-
witness has an inherently high probative value. 
But that point must be recognized along with a second 
countervailing point: in every criminal case, a defendant’s in-
terest in the outcome is obvious, therefore lessening the need 
for other impeachment evidence.197 Criminal defendants have a 
huge incentive to lie, and jurors are well aware of that huge in-
centive. Prosecutors may impeach defendants by pointing out 
their bias and self-interest.198  
Because that means of impeachment is so readily availa-
ble, the marginal value of additional impeachment evidence is 
diminished.199 The “discounted probative value” of a defen-
dant’s prior conviction is inherently low.  
Beyond those two points, there may not be much else to say 
about the probative value of Rule 609 evidence in any given 
case. It is doubtful whether much turns on the nature of the 
prior conviction. It is reasonable to argue that a rape conviction 
 
often [courts] make the mistake of assuming that the uncertainties of the 
Rule’s text provide license to exercise virtually unrestricted discretion.”).  
 197. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 112, § 39, at 173 (“The wit-
ness’s self-interest is evident when he is himself a party . . . .”). 
 198. See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6094 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing showings of bias 
as one of the prototypical forms of impeachment). 
 199. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1527 (1999) (“There is no basis for supposing that reci-
divists are more likely than first-time offenders to lie; both are criminals, and 
the incentive of a criminal to lie is unrelated to whether he has committed one 
crime or more than one.”). 
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shows more about a person’s truthfulness than a theft convic-
tion, and it is reasonable to argue the opposite. In either case, 
the fit between the fact of the prior conviction and the current 
assessment of credibility is somewhat loose. At bottom, the 
most sensible conclusion is that all (non-crimen falsi)200 crimes 
reflect somewhat on truthfulness. Nevertheless, they do not re-
flect a great deal, and no one type of crime reflects a great deal 
more than another. 
In short, all 609(a)(1) crimes have some probative value, 
but their probative value is inherently somewhat limited. 
b. Assessing Prejudice 
On the prejudice side of the scale, there are again two key 
points to bear in mind. First, if a prior conviction is similar to 
the charged offense, the potential for unfair prejudice is inhe-
rently high. Gordon correctly recognized that point,201 but it 
has been too often forgotten by courts since.202  
Second, if a prior conviction is much more serious than the 
charged offense, the potential for unfair prejudice is also high. 
Where a prior conviction is more inflammatory and frightening 
than the present offense, there is a greater danger that the jury 
will be distracted by the former and lose focus of the latter.203 
The risk of preventative conviction increases with the severity 
of the prior conviction. 
In short, all 609(a)(1) crimes have some potential for pre-
judice, but some crimes are much more prejudicial than others.  
c. Overall Balance and Results 
Within the universe of 609(a)(1) crimes, both probative 
value and potential for prejudice may vary depending on the 
circumstances, but the potential for prejudice varies more. Put 
differently, the strength of the proper inference—regarding 
character for truthfulness—varies a little from case to case, 
 
 200. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (making crimen falsi crimes admissible per 
se). 
 201. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“As a 
general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should be ad-
mitted sparingly . . . .”). 
 202. See, e.g., State v. Inhot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998) (admitting 
a prior rape conviction as impeachment evidence against a defendant-witness 
charged with rape).  
 203. See Edward E. Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other 
Name . . . : A Proposal To Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 
609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 781 (1990). 
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while the strength of the improper inference—regarding cha-
racter for criminality—varies a great deal. With that in mind, 
courts can implement a post-Gordon version of Rule 609 that is 
more in keeping with general principles of evidence law and 
more in keeping with the text of the Rule itself.  
To some extent, the test must remain case-specific, com-
mitted to a trial judge’s discretion. But while bright-line analyt-
ic rules are probably impossible, we can settle on some general 
rules of application. In general, where a prior conviction is sim-
ilar to the charged offense, it should not be admitted for im-
peachment. Similarly, where a prior conviction is much more 
serious than the charged offense, it should not be admitted for 
impeachment. Finally, where a prior conviction is dissimilar to 
the charged offense and less serious than the charged offense, it 
should be admitted. 
Results along those lines would be consistent with the text 
and rationale of Rule 609. They would be consistent with prin-
ciples of evidence law borrowed from Rule 403 jurisprudence 
and elsewhere. They would be consistent with both common 
sense and empirical evidence regarding jurors’ use of Rule 609 
impeachment evidence.  
Results along those lines would, on the whole, lead to the 
admission of fewer prior convictions for impeachment. In so 
doing, they would substantially reduce the cost of testifying 
and would eliminate a barrier that prevents many defendants 
from taking the stand.  
C. PROPOSAL THREE: FORGOING PERJURY ENHANCEMENTS FOR 
TRIAL TESTIMONY 
In addition to replacing the Gordon test for Rule 609 and 
abandoning Griffin’s “no adverse inference” rule, American 
courts should stop imposing sentencing enhancements for de-
fendants’ trial testimony. While such enhancements are consti-
tutionally valid, they are not sensible as a matter of sentencing 
policy. They also deter defendants from testifying, thus depriv-
ing the jury of important evidence and depriving the system of 
greater legitimacy.204 Sentencing courts should thus decline to 
impose perjury enhancements.  
 
 204. For a discussion of the other harms associated with perjury enhance-
ments, see Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in 
Federal Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of De-
fense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 
457–62 (2004). 
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1. Creation and Validation of Perjury Enhancements 
Like any other witness, a defendant who testifies falsely 
under oath may be prosecuted for perjury. But perjury prosecu-
tions are time-consuming and difficult; they are therefore 
rare.205 In order to deter perjury, most American jurisdictions 
allow judges to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on his 
trial testimony.206 Thus, if a defendant testifies at trial and de-
nies guilt, but the jury finds him guilty, the judge may impose a 
sentence based not only on the underlying crime but also on the 
perjured testimony.207 
In the federal system, Section 3C1.1 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines creates the sentence enhancement for 
perjury. It states that if the defendant “willfully obstructed or 
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administra-
tion of justice,” the judge should increase the offense level by 
two levels.208 The application notes make clear that Section 
3C1.1 covers false testimony at trial.209 Most states similarly 
allow some enhancement for a defendant’s perjured trial testi-
mony, either under state sentencing guidelines or as a part of a 
judge’s more general sentencing discretion.210  
 
 205. See Kevin J. Kelley, Note, To Enhance or Not to Enhance: A Guide to 
Uniformity in Applying Perjury Enhancements Under Section 3C1.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines: United States v. Dunnigan, 27 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 585, 585 (1994) (introducing the inconsistent application of per-
jury enhancements in American courts). 
 206. See Peter J. Henning, Balancing the Need for Enhanced Sentences for 
Perjury at Trial Under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and a De-
fendant’s Right to Testify, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 934 (1992).  
 207. Id. 
 208. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (2008). 
 209. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b) (stating that the enhancement applies to 
conduct including “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury, 
including during the course of a civil proceeding if such perjury pertains to 
conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction”). 
 210. See, e.g., Strachan v. State, 615 P.2d 611, 613 (Alaska 1980); State v. 
Lask, 663 P.2d 604, 605 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Redmond, 633 P.2d 
976, 982 (Cal. 1981); People v. Wilson, 599 P.2d 970, 972 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); 
State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Conn. 1986); Banks v. United States, 516 
A.2d 524, 528 (D.C. 1986); State v. Kohoutek, 619 P.2d 1151, 1152 (Idaho 
1980); People v. Meeks, 411 N.E.2d 9, 13 (Ill. 1980); State v. Bragg, 388 
N.W.2d 187, 189 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986); State v. May, 607 P.2d 72, 76–77 (Kan. 
1980); State v. Plante, 417 A.2d 991, 992 (Me. 1980); Atkins v. State, 391 A.2d 
868, 870 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); State v. James, 784 P.2d 1021, 1024 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1989); People v. Marchese, 608 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1994); State v. Stewart, 435 N.E.2d 426, 427 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Alicea, 449 A.2d 1381, 1382–83 (Pa. 1982); State v. Bertoldi, 495 
A.2d 247, 249 (R.I. 1985); State v. Degen, 396 N.W.2d 759, 760 (S.D. 1986); 
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At both the state and federal level, perjury enhancements 
have been attacked on the ground that they impermissibly bur-
den a defendant’s constitutional right to testify. The attacks, in 
other words, echo Griffin’s oversimplified suggestion that it is 
impermissible to “cut down” on the exercise of a constitutional 
right by “making its assertion costly.”211  
In United States v. Dunnigan, the Supreme Court faced 
such a constitutional challenges to section 3C1.1.212 The Court 
responded by stated that “a defendant’s right to testify does not 
include a right to commit perjury.”213 That response, widely 
parroted by state courts upholding their own perjury enhance-
ments,214 has a “beguiling simplicity”215—which is to say that it 
is both facile and a bit fatuous. In Griffin, the Court might just 
as well have said that “a defendant’s right to remain silent does 
not include the right to conceal and withhold relevant evi-
dence.” Indeed, a court can almost always evade an unconstitu-
tional conditions challenge by redefining the scope of the right. 
In any event, the Dunnigan Court went on to argue (more 
sensibly) that not every rule that burdens a constitutional right 
is unconstitutional.  
Nor can respondent contend § 3C1.1 is unconstitutional on the simple 
basis that it distorts her decision whether to testify or remain silent. 
Our authorities do not impose a categorical ban on every governmen-
tal action affecting the strategic decisions of an accused, including de-
cisions whether or not to exercise constitutional rights.216 
That portion of Dunnigan’s rationale, while inconsistent 
with Griffin, is surely correct. Many legal rules burden either 
the right to testify or the right to remain silent, and perjury 
 
State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160–61 (Tenn. 1983); In re Welfare of Luft, 
589 P.2d 314, 320–21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47, 49 
(W. Va. 1987). 
 211. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
 212. 507 U.S. 87, 89 (1993). 
 213. Id. at 96; see also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978) 
(“The right guaranteed by law to a defendant is narrowly the right to testify 
truthfully in accordance with the oath . . . .”). 
 214. See, e.g., In re Perez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); 
People v. Nedelcoff, 409 N.E.2d 316, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Atkins v. State, 
391 A.2d 868, 871 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); People v. Adams, 425 N.W.2d 
437, 442 (Mich. 1988); People v. Malcolm, 612 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1994); State v. Stewart, 435 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Common-
wealth v. Bowersox, 690 A.2d 279, 281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); State v. Tiernan, 
645 A.2d 482, 487 (R.I. 1994). 
 215. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Baze-
lon, C.J.). 
 216. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96. 
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enhancements are not unconstitutional on the simple ground 
that they chill testimony. The question remains, however, 
whether perjury enhancements are sensible as a matter of sen-
tencing policy. 
2. The Flawed Rationale of Perjury Enhancements 
In approving perjury enhancements, courts have relied on 
traditional sentencing goals including deterrence, retribution, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. They argue that perjury is 
wrong and ought to be deterred,217 that a defendant’s perjury 
suggests the need for incapacitation and retribution,218 and 
that a perjuring defendant demonstrates a lack of remorse and 
thus less hope of rehabilitation.219 
Those arguments are faulty because they ask and answer 
the wrong question. The question is not whether a defendant 
who lies on the stand is culpable—surely he is. The question, 
rather, is whether a guilty defendant who takes the stand is 
more culpable than a guilty defendant who remains silent. The 
answer to that question is far from clear for two reasons.  
First, while a testifying guilty defendant is culpable for ly-
ing to the jury, a non-testifying guilty defendant is culpable for 
concealing evidence. There are two kinds of deliberate deceit: 
suggestio falsi and suppressio veri.220 The testifying guilty de-
fendant commits the former sin while the non-testifying guilty 
defendant commits the latter. In many contexts, the law has 
recognized that deception “may consist in silence as well as in 
actual outspoken misrepresentation, and there are circums-
tances when the suppressio veri may be reprehensible as the 
suggestio falsi.”221 Under federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 
 
 217. See, e.g., United States v. Rohde, 159 F.3d 1298, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998); 
State v. Grindle, 942 A.2d 673, 677 (Me. 2008); People v. Marchese, 608 
N.Y.S.2d 776, 7853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). 
 218. See People v. Ramos, 53 P.3d 1178, 1179 (Colo. App. 2002). 
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1235 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. 
Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973); Fox v. State, 569 P.2d 1335, 1337 
(Alaska 1977); In re Perez, 148 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People 
v. Wilson, 599 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo. App. 1979); People v. Meeks, 411 N.E.2d 9, 
15 (Ill. 1980). 
 220. See WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 169 (2d ed. 1992); see al-
so Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790–1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 
39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 407 (1995).  
 221. The Kalfarli, 277 F. 391, 400 (2d Cir. 1921). The law of conveyances in 
property, for example, has long treated the two concepts as equivalent. See, 
e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 73 F.2d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 1934); Eppes v. 
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for example, affirmative misstatements of fact prove unneces-
sary for conviction—deceitful concealment suffices.222  
Indeed, even Section 3C1.1 recognizes that concealing ma-
terial evidence constitutes obstruction of justice.223 A guilty de-
fendant who refuses to testify may not affirmatively lie, but he 
does conceal evidence. Operating under Griffin’s shadow, courts 
have not considered imposing the Section 3C1.1 obstruction 
enhancement based on a defendant’s failure to testify. Once 
again, the difference between punishments based on testimony 
and punishments based on silence creates an unexplained and 
unjustified constitutional asymmetry. 
Second, a non-testifying guilty defendant often simply has 
someone else lie on his behalf. He presents a false defense by 
proxy, using other witnesses and his attorney. In general, an 
attorney acts as an agent of the client, and a principal can be 
held responsible for the acts of his agent.224 In criminal cases as 
elsewhere, because an attorney acts as “speaking agent” for her 
client, the statements of the defense attorney can be held 
against the defendant.225 “A defendant cannot stand idly by 
while he hears his attorney provide false information to the 
court . . . and then claim that he was exercising his Fifth 
Amendment right.”226 If a defendant can be held accountable 
 
Thompson, 79 So. 611, 613 (Ala. 1918); Jacobs v. George, 20 P. 183, 187 (Ariz. 
1889); Ambrose v. Barrett, 54 P. 264, 265 (Cal. 1898); Dunlap & Co. v. Cody, 
31 Iowa 260, 262 (Iowa 1871); see also Smith v. Babcock, 22 F. Cas. 432, 441 
(D. Mass. 1846) (“In such cases there is little if any difference between sup-
pressio veri and suggestio falsi.”). 
 222. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1997); United States 
v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hasson, 333 
F.3d 1264, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 
1173 (9th Cir. 1990); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579 
(1996) (“[A]ctionable fraud requires a material misrepresentation or omission.” 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977))). 
 223. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(d) (2008). 
 224. Hayes v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999); Da-
vidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1984); LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 
685, 694 (1st Cir. 1983); Ampex Credit Corp. v. Bateman, 554 F.2d 750, 753 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
 225. See United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 31–34 (2d Cir. 1984); see 
also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) (admitting statements authorized by the par-
ty’s speaking agents, including attorneys); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 119, § 8.31 (discussing the role of attorneys as “speaking agents”). 
 226. United States v. Owolabi, 69 F.3d 156, 164 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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for lies that he utters with his own mouth, he should also be 
held accountable for lies that others utter for him.227  
Thus, while it is true that testifying guilty defendants are 
culpable for lying, it is also true that many non-testifying guilty 
defendants are culpable for concealing evidence and for having 
others lie on their behalf. It is hard to see why the former are 
more culpable than the latter. If both are equally culpable, per-
jury enhancements are unjustified. Surprisingly, many courts 
have endorsed perjury enhancements without even considering 
whether testifying guilty defendants are more culpable than 
non-testifying guilty defendants. In this area as in others, the 
law reflects an unstated and unjustified preference for silence 
over testimony. 
3. Perjury Enhancements After Booker 
In the federal system after Dunnigan, several circuits held 
that Section 3C1.1 enhancements were mandatory if a judge 
determined that the defendant lied on the stand.228 Other cir-
cuits suggested that enhancements were discretionary.229 Man-
datory or not, perjury enhancements have since Dunnigan been 
imposed routinely, almost mechanically, across the federal 
criminal justice system.230 
In the wake of Booker,231 however, courts have both re-
newed reason and renewed ability to reconsider the imposition 
of perjury enhancements. The Guidelines are now advisory—
district courts must consult them, but they are not bound to 
apply them.232 In addition to considering the Guidelines, dis-
trict courts must consider the broader array of factors listed in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including “the need to avoid unwarranted 
 
 227. See Fuller v. State, 860 A.2d 324, 333 (Del. 2004) (imposing a sentenc-
ing enhancement where defendant remained silent but encouraged another 
witness to commit perjury). 
 228. See, e.g., United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d 783, 788–89 (1st Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Alvarez, 927 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 311 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Yost, 24 F.3d 99, 106 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Sho-
nubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 468–70 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.) (discussing the 
split of authority); Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 19 (1993) (“There is still interpretive room, in other 
words, for restoring equilibrium to the criminal process . . . .”). 
 230. See Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying 
Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2000). 
 231. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 232. Id. at 264. 
 2009] MAKING DEFENDANTS SPEAK 1375 
 
sentence disparities” among similarly situated defendants.233 
In short, district courts have greater freedom “to reject (after 
due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines,”234 particularly 
when a particular provision of the Guidelines makes no sense. 
Post-Booker, district courts have greater freedom to decline 
Section 3C1.1 enhancements for trial testimony. District courts 
should ask themselves: “Is this defendant, who testified at trial 
and was found guilty, truly more culpable then another guilty 
defendant who remained silent and pressed a false defense by 
proxy?” If not, then no enhancement should be imposed. State 
court judges, many of whom have even greater sentencing free-
dom than federal judges, should ask themselves the same ques-
tion.  
Perjurious defendants are culpable, and perjury enhance-
ments are constitutional, but such enhancements are still un-
wise. 
  CONCLUSION   
The right to remain silent and the right to testify are inex-
tricably intertwined. The extent to which defendants exercise 
one right depends on its cost relative to the other. Any penalty 
on the right to remain silent raises its relative cost, but also 
lowers the relative cost of the right to testify. Any subsidy has 
the converse offsetting effect. 
Courts and commentators have too often analyzed the 
rights separately and have therefore missed the dynamic of off-
setting effects. More generally, they have failed to see that la-
bels like “penalty” and “subsidy” are relative terms that can on-
ly be measured by reference to some baseline condition. 
American courts have unjustifiably struck down rules that 
raise the relative cost of silence while upholding rules that 
raise the relative cost of testimony. Taken together, these rul-
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ings can only be explained by positing silence as the desired 
normative baseline from which all departures are measured. 
American law, in other words, currently reflects an implicit 
policy preference for silence over testimony. That preference 
has never been explained, and it cannot be justified. More tes-
timony by criminal defendants would improve the accuracy, le-
gitimacy, and fairness of the criminal justice system. Legal 
rules that raise the relative cost of testimony undermine these 
critically important goals. 
Our baseline condition ought to be defined by generally ap-
plicable rules of law. To the extent that we depart from such 
rules, we should depart in a way that encourages more testi-
mony. At a minimum, we should not depart in a way that en-
courages silence. For the last half century, American law has 
departed in the wrong direction, and it is time to reverse 
course. 
